Erik van Straten<p><span class="h-card" translate="no"><a href="https://infosec.exchange/@relishthecracker" class="u-url mention" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">@<span>relishthecracker</span></a></span> : that's make belief.</p><p>"Wow, asymmetric encryption, even quantum-computer-proof", "military-grade", etcetera.</p><p>Right after logging in using a passkey with an unbreakably protected private key, the website sends a session cookie (or similar) to the browser - which is NOT protected like private keys. If a website (like most of them) does not log you out if your IP-address changes, such a cookie is nearly as bad as a password. And fully if the cookie never expires.</p><p>Therefore:</p><p>1️⃣ Even if attackers cannot copy private keys: if the user device is sufficiently compromised (i.e. on Android, running an accessibility service), they can take over all of the user's accounts;</p><p>2️⃣ If the user's browser is compromised, attackers can copy session cookies and use them to obtain access to accounts the user logs in to;</p><p>3️⃣ An AitM (Attacker in the Middle) using a malicious website can copy/steal authentication cookies. Such AitM-attacks are possible in at least the following cases if either:</p><p>• A malicious third party website manages to obtain a fraudulently issued certificate (examples: <a href="https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/112914050216821746" rel="nofollow noopener" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://</span><span class="ellipsis">infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat</span><span class="invisible">en/112914050216821746</span></a>);</p><p>• An attacker obtains unauthorised write access to the website's DNS record;</p><p>• An attacker manages to obtain access to a server where a "dangling" (forgotten) subdomain name points to, *AND* the real authenticating server (RP) does not carefully check for allowed subdomains (see <a href="https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/97#issuecomment-175766580" rel="nofollow noopener" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://</span><span class="ellipsis">github.com/w3ctag/design-revie</span><span class="invisible">ws/issues/97#issuecomment-175766580</span></a>);</p><p>4️⃣ The server is compromised or has a rogue admin: the attacker can add their passkey's public key to your account, or replace your public key with theirs (note that passkey pubkeys are not encapsulated by certificates issued by trusted issuers, stating who owns the public key).</p><p>Phishing using fake websites is probably the number one problem on the internet. *THE* major advantage of passkeys is that they make phishing attacks VERY HARD.</p><p>Indeed, if your device is sufficiently compromised, the risk of all of your passwords being stolen if you use a password manager is BIG.</p><p>However, as I wrote, if your device is sufficiently compromised, an attacker does not need access to your private keys in order to obtain access to your accounts.</p><p><span class="h-card" translate="no"><a href="https://sigmoid.social/@oliversampson" class="u-url mention" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">@<span>oliversampson</span></a></span> <span class="h-card" translate="no"><a href="https://cathode.church/@kaye" class="u-url mention" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">@<span>kaye</span></a></span> </p><p><a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/Passkeys" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">#<span>Passkeys</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/PasswordManagers" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">#<span>PasswordManagers</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/DomainNames" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">#<span>DomainNames</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/Phishing" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">#<span>Phishing</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/AitM" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">#<span>AitM</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/MitM" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">#<span>MitM</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/Cryptography" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">#<span>Cryptography</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/MilitaryGrade" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">#<span>MilitaryGrade</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/Authentication" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">#<span>Authentication</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/Impersonation" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">#<span>Impersonation</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/FakeWebsites" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">#<span>FakeWebsites</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/ATO" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">#<span>ATO</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/AccountTakeOver" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">#<span>AccountTakeOver</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/Passwords" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">#<span>Passwords</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/SharedSecrets" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">#<span>SharedSecrets</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/AsymmetricCryptography" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">#<span>AsymmetricCryptography</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/SubDomains" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">#<span>SubDomains</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/DanglingSubDomains" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">#<span>DanglingSubDomains</span></a></p>